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NO. 5 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Operation Barkhane and the Future of 
Intervention in the Sahel 
The Shape of Things to Come 
Denis M. Tull 
France is preparing to change its posture in the Sahel. After a “mini surge” of 600 addi-
tional soldiers since February 2020, its counterterrorism Operation Barkhane is likely 
to revert to the pre-surge level, with more reductions possible in the medium term. 
Regardless of the details and timetable of the adjustments, French policy toward the 
Sahel is evolving as Paris seeks to balance a lighter military footprint with counter-
terrorism goals, the continued internationalization of intervention, and more local 
responsibility. 
 
The return to the pre-surge level (4,500 sol-
diers) or perhaps even more reductions may 
come as a surprise, considering that the surge 
was effective in strictly military terms. Ac-
cording to Chief of Staff François Lecointre, 
it increased the volume of French forces 
directly involved in military operations by 
70 percent. Two other factors amplified this 
impact. The surge went hand in hand with 
a strong focus on the three-borders area 
between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, 
which helped to turn quantity into quality. 
Finally, the long-planned armament of 
Barkhane’s three Reaper drones, effective 
since December 2019, has enhanced the 
readiness of the force and sharply reduced 
its reaction time when presented with op-
portunities to strike. More than 40 percent 
of Barkhane’s air strikes are now conducted 
by drones. These factors have contributed 
to numerous tactical successes in the year 
since the Sahel Summit in Pau (13 January 
2020), when French President Emmanuel 
Macron and his five Sahelian counterparts 
from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
and Niger sought to reenergize the inter-
vention. Among Barkhane’s notable suc-
cesses was the neutralization of Abdel-
malek Droukdel, leader of AQMI (Al Qaida 
in the Islamic Maghreb), and of Bah Ag 
Moussa, a military commander of the 
Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musul-
mans (GSIM). 
The post-Pau year has not fundamentally 
changed the political and security context, 
but it has given some reprieve to the armies 
of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso after a dis-
astrous 2019, during which they suffered 
possibly more than a thousand casualties at 
the hands of jihadist groups. However, the 
year’s events showed again that more coun-
terterrorism does not translate into greater 
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levels of security. The level of internal dis-
placement in Mali has continued to rise – 
from 200,000 in November 2019 to 311,000 
in October 2020 – also in the context of 
military operations during which the armies 
of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger allegedly 
committed numerous human rights abuses. 
The number of human rights abuses com-
mitted by community-based armed militias 
and jihadist groups has also risen. 
An Evolving Political Posture 
Why would Paris relinquish the additional 
personnel means that have proved so effec-
tive? Military adjustments, whether they 
are made in the short term or medium 
term, should not be seen in isolation from 
a possibly evolving policy. For example, in 
recent weeks and months, French officials 
have frequently engaged in the long-stand-
ing debate in Mali on whether the govern-
ment in Bamako should seek to politically 
accommodate jihadist groups in one form 
or the other. Despite a well-versed intran-
sigence on the necessity of countering 
terrorism, declarations by officials during 
the past 12 months can be interpreted as 
attempts to somehow modify the narrative 
and the strategy. Although the French rejec-
tion of dialogue with jihadists was always 
less clear-cut than is often assumed, recent 
declarations suggest that Paris is now being 
careful to not be seen as an obstacle to 
political pathways that may lead out of the 
crisis. Indicators are allusions to the porosity 
and ill-defined nature of armed groups, and 
rhetorical distinctions between local and 
international jihadists or between radicals 
and recuperable elements. Whatever one 
may think of the pertinence of these catego-
ries, the discourse may signal at a minimum 
a more ambiguous and possibly more accom-
modating stance toward the controversial 
issue of political dialogue with jihadists, 
even if the determination to fight them 
remains firm. Paris remains skeptical about 
the prospects of success of political acco-
mmodation, not least because past Bamako-
led initiatives have made little headway. 
If the French government excludes that it 
will itself negotiate with “terrorist groups,” 
it is a different matter whether it will stand 
in Bamako’s way, should Mali’s authorities 
want to take that route. French discourse 
emphasizes Malian sovereignty. This is why 
the analogy with Afghanistan – where the 
United States negotiated bilaterally with the 
Taliban and excluded the Afghan govern-
ment – is not pertinent. However, a litmus 
test for the French commitment has yet to 
come. A meaningful French alignment be-
hind a Malian push toward dialogue would 
ultimately require Barkhane to put its mili-
tary operations on hold, at least temporarily. 
The evolving French posture is a prag-
matic move of realpolitik, which takes into 
account that Mali’s new military authorities 
have repeatedly affirmed their willingness 
to explore this route. Given how often French 
and other officials have bemoaned a lack 
of Malian leadership and ownership in the 
past, tacitly aligning behind the government 
is ultimately in Paris’s best interest. The nu-
merous military strikes of the past 12 months 
against jihadist targets do not necessarily 
contravene the idea of giving dialogue a 
chance. They also present a necessary move 
to alter the balance of power on the battle-
field, which was dramatically unfavorable 
to the Malian government just one year 
ago. Moreover, France can only disengage 
on a positive note. Everything else would 
be a political and strategic failure. 
Drivers of Change 
The adjustments to the French posture have 
been looming for the past year. In January 
2020, at the occasion of the Sahel Summit 
in Pau, Macron had shaken up an untena-
ble situation by going public with two un-
expected admissions. First, that governments 
and parts of the public in the Sahel enter-
tain, at best, ambiguous attitudes toward 
the French, and to a lesser extent inter-
national intervention. Second, that the po-
litical and security trends in the Sahel were 
moving in the wrong direction, despite inter-
national intervention. In other words, Paris 
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had recognized the relative ineffectiveness 
of intervention as well as its fragile local 
legitimacy. 
One year onward, the situation has 
somewhat evolved thanks to the surge, 
but within the narrow limits of what seems 
to be achievable. Indeed, Macron’s pre-Pau 
analysis is unlikely to have fundamentally 
changed. This means that the government 
is unwilling to sustain a large, costly, and 
open-ended presence in the Sahel that is 
unable to catalyze strategic and political 
progress. At least in military terms, France 
may have achieved the best possible out-
come. The visible successes of 2020 may 
provide an opportunity to start disengaging 
with the head held high. 
One factor are the costs. Barkhane is a 
strategic burden. While the operation gen-
erates valuable experiences and lessons, 
other or newly emerging threats and theaters 
in France’s and Europe’s strategic environ-
ment are rising on the agenda (the EU’s 
eastern borders, the Eastern and Southern 
Mediterranean, cyberspace) and will feature 
prominently in a revised Strategic Review 
of Defense and National Security that is in 
the making. 
Barkhane presents significant financial 
costs (€695 million in 2019, and closer to €1 
billion in 2020), which equals 76 percent of 
the country’s expenditure for its military 
missions and operations at home and ab-
road. Amid the economic pressure caused 
by the Covid-19 pandemic, these costs may 
be more difficult to defend for an operation 
that has long been met with public indiffer-
ence at home, and this despite the fact that 
the public considers terrorist attacks to be a 
major threat to national security. This sug-
gests that the French are not necessarily 
convinced that Sahel-based terrorism is a 
major threat to France. Conversely, the 
French media and members of parliament 
have recently given more scrutiny to Opera-
tion Barkhane as the number of French 
casualties has grown. Since 2013, 51 French 
soldiers have lost their lives in the Sahel, 
but 30 of them have died just over the past 
two years. Although nothing suggests that 
Barkhane will be anything more than a 
minor issue ahead of the 2022 presidential 
elections, reducing costs and casualties can 
only be advantageous. 
Barkhane: Successful Tactics, 
Little Progress 
Decision-makers in Paris know that a more 
favorable situation to start disengagement 
will not emerge any time soon. Two such 
opportunities were missed: after the sweep-
ing Serval campaign in 2013, and again in 
2015, when the signing of the Mali peace 
accord provided a reasonably appropriate 
exit option. The limits of what French (mili-
tary) intervention in the Sahel may realis-
tically achieve have been evident for some 
time, not least to the French military itself. 
Indeed, it has become a truism to state that 
Barkhane’s tactical successes do not trans-
late into overall progress. 
First, the political objectives that Bar-
khane was to support always remained 
vague and excessively optimistic. This is 
true for the idea that the military contain-
ment of the terrorist threat would somehow 
help create conditions for political progress 
in the guise of the Malian peace accord and 
security solutions, thanks to the revamping 
of local security and defense forces. In the 
absence of political reform, the capacity-
building approach pursued by foreign part-
ners (EUTM Mali) has shown modest results, 
while the implementation of the peace 
accord or other forms of political change 
has remained intangible. Barkhane labors 
in a strategic void. 
Second, no political ambitions were 
attached to Barkhane itself. Barkhane’s 
basic premise is to stay away from Malian 
politics. This is evident, for example, in the 
fact that Barkhane has avoided being drawn 
into the political and violent quagmire in 
Mali’s central region. But Barkhane’s pur-
ported claim to be apolitical by virtue of its 
counterterrorism focus is inconsistent on 
several accounts. Barkhane and its inter-
national allies have literally constituted a 
security umbrella under which political 
elites in Bamako and the north – basically 
SWP Comment 5 
January 2021 
4 
the signatories of the Algiers accord – have 
comfortably pursued their own self-inter-
ested agendas rather than face the conse-
quences of their own (in)actions. Similarly, 
Barkhane’s claim of being apolitical never 
had any credibility among Malians, who 
failed to understand why northern towns 
should be liberated from jihadists, but not 
from secessionist-leaning rebels. From this 
perspective, Barkhane was decisively involved 
in domestic politics, and any pretense to 
the contrary has only aroused mistrust and 
rumors about France’s hidden agendas. 
Finally, Barkhane’s sheer presence and 
the steady French discourse on counterter-
rorism has not helped the emergence of a 
more nuanced analysis of the Mali situa-
tion. Important challenges other than ter-
rorism have not received the attention they 
deserve by Malian, French, and internation-
al decision-makers. Nowhere has this been 
more evident than in central Mali, where 
absent or ineffective institutions, eroding 
social capital, and violent socioeconomic 
competition explain much of the ease with 
which armed groups, not only jihadists, 
have expanded their power and authority. 
Outlook 
France is likely to reduce its military foot-
print in the Sahel in the foreseeable future. 
This is driven by the accurate assessment 
that the counterterrorism-centered inter-
vention framework, in place since 2014, 
has reached its limits. However, the choice 
is not between staying and withdrawing. 
French decision-makers will seek to strike 
a balance between the political goal of 
beginning disengagement and the possible 
consequences of such a process. 
In the short run, a steep reduction in 
troop numbers would embolden jihadist 
groups and overwhelm partner armies in 
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Once troop 
reductions of some consequence set in, 
France is expected to make even greater use 
of remote warfare, such as intelligence co-
operation, armed drones, special forces, and 
security force assistance. Mentoring local 
forces during military operations will remain 
high on the agenda to bring a qualitative 
edge to the long-term capacity-building that 
is the hallmark of much of the security 
force assistance in Mali. In this regard, the 
EU military training mission’s (EUTM Mali) 
increasingly decentralized provision of 
training and advising the Malian army is 
welcome. But just as important, there should 
be a renewed push to negotiate with the 
Bamako military authorities’ security-sector 
reform initiatives. There is no reason to ex-
pect the emergence of effective and self-sus-
taining defense and security forces as long 
as fundamental reforms (human resources, 
logistics, accountability) are frustrated by 
Malian officials. 
The lighter French military footprint 
brings both opportunities and risks. Should 
Barkhane reduce its presence in the theater, 
jihadist forces will enjoy more freedom of 
movement. Consequently, this will expose 
the Malian army as well as foreign troops 
with EUTM, MINUSMA, and civilian orga-
nizations to greater risks of attacks. This 
makes intelligence even more important, 
to which Germany’s MINUSMA contingent 
contributes via its drones. But casualties 
may still occur and will become a test for 
the European commitment to Mali and the 
Sahel. In this regard, a fresh debate about 
what is and is not at stake for Europe in the 
Sahel would be useful. German and Euro-
pean security are not directly threatened 
by the Sahel. The challenge is not so much 
terrorism and migration, but a smart policy 
that promotes legitimate political orders 
and may also inhibit the further regional 
spread of the crisis. Helping neighboring 
countries to become more resilient in a pre-
ventive sense should be a priority. 
A lighter military footprint, and thus a 
lesser emphasis on terrorism, is an opportu-
nity for a more balanced and nuanced con-
versation with Malian partners on political 
challenges to stabilization and ultimately 
peacebuilding. It will be decisive what local 
actors in the Sahel, and particularly in 
Mali, will make of the space that the pros-
pect of a lighter French military presence 
may open up. 
Dr. Denis M. Tull is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Research Division at SWP. 
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